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Comments on Daekeun Park and Changyong Rhee’s 
paper “Building infrastructure for the Asian bond 
markets: settlement and credit rating” 
Tom Byrne 
I shall limit my remarks to Section III of Park and Rhee’s paper. 
The authors conclude by arguing that “harmonisation” of local and global credit rating 
agencies is necessary to develop an Asian bond market. If what the authors mean is 
constraining competition between and the independence of credit rating agencies, I disagree. 
While the authors reject, rightfully, going down the route of government-supported rating 
agencies, they do not adequately appreciate how global agencies function or their role in the 
market. From an Asian-centric point of view, the authors’ basic gripe is that global credit 
rating agencies are ignorant of local conditions, implying that they currently lack and will 
never have the capability to deliver accurate and objective rating opinions on local currency 
bond issuers. Their argument is convoluted, however, and does not appreciate that factors 
that affect credit fundamentals tend to be universal. The authors should have stuck more 
closely to the solution they cite in the opening paragraph of the subsection “The need for a 
regional credit rating agency”. That is, “[t]he simplest means to meet this need would be to 
utilise global credit rating agencies, rather than establish a new regional institution”. To which 
I would add, use global agencies along with competitive local agencies.  
The fact is that global rating agencies are already increasingly expanding ratings in local 
markets, in Asia and elsewhere, employing local staff along with experienced staff from their 
home offices. Expansion includes assigning ratings on an agency’s global scale, and also 
rating local corporations on country-specific rating scales. Moody’s has ownership stakes in 
local rating agency affiliates that use indigenous rating scales. Moody’s also uses national 
scale ratings where it does not have affiliates so as to fit into local credit rating systems. A 
national scale does not necessarily convey the same information as Moody’s global scale 
rating symbols - the probability and expected severity of default. Rather, national rating 
scales are essentially ordinal, and issuers are notched down from the best issuer (Aaa by 
definition), providing a relative ranking of creditworthiness. Local rating scales are not as 
powerful as a rating agency’s global scale. One important reason for such local scales is that 
capital market regulators in many emerging market countries require that a corporation 
receive an investment grade rating in order to issue. Therefore, regulators themselves have 
historically limited the universe of ratings. Thus, the national authorities themselves restrict 
the downward range of ratings on the part of either a local or a global rating agency, and 
foster a concentrated distribution of relatively high ratings. 
Another mistaken notion of the authors is that global rating scales are not suitable for 
emerging markets. The authors claim that because the sovereign ratings for emerging 
market sovereigns are lower than in advanced economies (as laid out in Table 8), emerging 
market corporations are destined to have ratings concentrated in lower rating levels. This is 
not necessarily so, but to the extent that it is so, it reflects an assessment of credit 
fundamentals, not rating methodology biases. The fact is that the sovereign defaults in recent 
history (starting with Russia in 1998) occurred with non-investment grade emerging market 
government bonds (at the time), not investment grade rated government bonds. So the 
global rating scale functions as intended. The table lists foreign currency government ratings, 
but Moody’s rating practice allows in select cases a corporation to pierce the foreign currency 
rating of the government. This happens mostly in countries that are assigned low ratings. 
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corporations by the local currency rating of the government (because the possibility of the 
imposition of foreign exchange controls is moot for local currency obligations). 
Credit rating agencies in the United States developed in an environment of competition. I do 
not think that the authors’ stress on “harmonisation” and coordination “in building a common 
credit rating system” captures the essence of how rating agencies have contributed to the 
efficiency of markets. The credit rating industry has its roots in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of 
free speech and constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press. Credit rating agencies 
exist in a publishing culture that values objectivity, accuracy and attentiveness to investor 
needs. A rating agency sells its judgments in a competitive marketplace that rewards 
credibility, and an agency accepts the reality that market forces will punish bad performance. 
Recently, in the United States, the number of rating agencies recognised by the market 
regulator increased to four from three, in an effort to heighten competition and accuracy, but 
not to foster harmonisation. A danger in the authors’ prescription is that rating agencies might 
be appropriated either implicitly or explicitly by governmental authorities. In this event, 
companies would be buying a licence to issue bonds, rather than buying the credibility of a 
credit rating agency’s opinion. Investor confidence would be sacrificed, along with efficiency 
in allocating capital and pricing risk into credit decisions. Rather, the authors should urge an 
improvement in accounting and disclosure practices of issuers in Asian bond markets - just 
like efforts under way in the US capital market at present. 